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DNA Profiles

If you found this file in an archive use the keyword " nutteingdq " in a search-engine to find an updated version or related files, or if too recent then keyword " nutteingd" .
File updated Jul 2008

Sections

Intro
Technical Terms
Data Protection Act - Subject Access - Forensic Science Service
Cases Highlighting Problems with DNA Profiling
False Matches
Latest estimate of the number of unrelated DNA profile matches within the NDNAD
A New Variant of Miscarriages of Justice
2001 Criminal Justice and Police Act section 82
The Wider Implications of DNA Profiles - the Attribution Problem
Vulnerability of the UK NDNAD
Technical Problems with DNA Profiles
Lies, Damn Lies and Statistics
Ethnic Normalisation of DNA Profiles
Co-ancestry and Allele Frequency
Losers of the police/forensic DNA lottery
Ethnic Normalisation of DNA Profiles
The D2S1338 Anomaly in the UK
International Normalisation Data Relating to AmpFISTR SGM Plus DNA Profiles
Disturbing Developements for the Orwellian/Kafkaesque Future
Death knell for DNA profiles?
They hound your family, even after death, and through your children
A New Racism ?
Un-investigated Spontaneous Mutations
John Doe Indictments
Future Developements
Exposing Low Copy Number - LCN


Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics
We must not expect more precision than the subject-matter admits
...
for it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician scientific proofs.
Twenty three centuries later, great reliance has been placed on the vallidity of DNA profiling as a foolproof method of establishing guilt or innocence of a defendent. In many instances, DNA profiles have been responsible for the conviction of suspects when no other substantial evidence of their guilt has been found. In some cases, profiles have been presented as establishing guilt beyond any reasonable doubt despite other evidence which points to the accused innocence.

If, as is claimed, the chance of two people sharing the same DNA profile is greater than one in 100,000,000,000, a positive match between a suspect's profile and a profile obtained at the scene of a crime would, indeed, appear to be damning evidence. As that is more than this planets population over all time, it would be difficult to argue against the two profiles, having come from the same source, although how the DNA came to be at the scene of the crime would still have to be established.

The Promega company, that manufactures the kit for doing DNA profile analysis, trumpets this on their web-page:
ABI SGM Plus ( the system used in the UK ) - Chance for a random match- more than 1 in 100 Billion i.e. 100,000,000,000 or 20 times the population of the earth.
This statement is criminal in its falsity.
About 2/3 way down this file http://www.promega.com/geneticidproc/eusymp2proc/11.pdf

As attested by the number of people 'caught' because their DNA profile just happens to match a scene-of-crime sample profile. The figure for false matches is now about 1 in 240,000 . There are many pairs of people around, with different DNA, but matching DNA profiles.

DNA is unique (twins excepted) but DNA profiles are not unique.

More insurmountable problems, concern the lack of validation of the process. The last proper International validation exercise in 1997 showed an enormous number of errors. Then the number of "unresolved matches" in DNA databases that forensic science will not address. And finally, inter-relatedness/co-ancestry, if factored into the analyses, brings the "match probability" figures down dramatically.


Despite official government sites linking to these files there are still corrupt persons knocking out my sites, so for the purposes of searchengines cross-linking them, files no longer available on the original web hosting sites were on http://www.nutteing.50megs.com/dnapr.htm , http://www.nutteing.freeisp.co.uk/dnapr.htm , http://nutteing.no-frills.net/dnapr.htm and http://nutteing3.no-frills.net/dnapr.htm and http://www.nutteing.dabsol.co.uk/dnapr.htm (last 3 due now to host failure )
http://www.nutteing.batcave.net/dnapr.htm , http://home.graffiti.net/nutteing/dnapr.htm

Technical Terms

The technical bit.
I will keep it to a minimum ,but of necessity, some technical words appear in this article. The following is a brief explanation and glossary.

A locus is a specific area on a chromosome that can be readily identified and in this article usually concern, unusually, sequences of DNA ,e.g. ...CGATCGATCGATCGAT... which is CGAT repeated 4 times. These repeats are highly variable in number hence their usefulness (VNTR = Variable Number Tandem Repeat).
The number 4 , in this case, is the allele (variant ) which becomes just one of the 20 numbers in the (UK) DNA profile. For each pair of chromosomes there is one from the mother and one from the father. So ,4, from one parent and perhaps 6 times the CGAT repeat from the other parent, so number 6. So for this one locus a pair of alleles/variants (4,6), smaller number first by convention, as the origin of each i.e. mother or father, remains unknown. Then 9 other loci on different chromosomes giving 10x2 numbers in each profile in the UK NDNAD (National DNA Database) .

The average number of possible alleles, for all races, at each locus is 14. So permutations of selecting from 14 numbers , 2 at a time, 10 times over is truly a very large number. But ,a very big BUT, the chance of inheriting a particular allele is not equal through the range of possible alleles. The number 14 is also reduced if you just consider one ethnicity.
PCR - Polymerase Chain Reaction , the thermocycling amplification process.
STR- Short Tandem Repeat; short, repetitive sequence elements of 2-5 bases. STR's used in DNA profiling are polymorphic, which is to say that the number of repeat elements varies between individuals in a population.
Consider the locus called THO1
Variant Allele (fractional allele) - an STR allele with an incomplete allele. A common THO1 variant allele is 9.3. This allele has 9 full repeats plus 3 nucleotides.
Nucleotide- a building block of DNA or RNA

From a private communication between myself and Professor Sir Alec Jeffreys to clarify some of this material.
"Amelogenin is used to establish gender. the other markers are not on X or Y; for markers named DmSnnn (e.g. D2S1338 ), m stands for the number of the chromosome on which the marker is found. The columns give the marker types found in an individual; e.g. this person has VWA alleles (variants) type 17 and 19. There's no significance to the order in which pairs of markers are presented; it's conventional to give the smaller first. Hence the numbers in the right column are always as big as or bigger than those in the middle column."
Regards
Alec Jeffreys

Some more general information regarding DNA profiles
Automsomes occur in pairs, each individual receives one from their mother and one from the father. Therefore, at each marker included in SGM+ (the proprietary system used in the UK), a person will receive one from their mother and one from their father. The child is a composite of the parents. A child will receive one each of a parents 22 autosome pairs 1 to 22. The child will also receive one of the mother's X chromosomes (mothers are XX) and either an X chromosome from the father (female child) or a Y chromosome from the father (male child)- fathers are XY. There is a 50% chance that any given child will receive one or the other chromosome pair from each parent.

The following is for the benefit of people like Fian Dawson who should have a test done with the same markers assuming a proper "chain of custody". This is to avoid sleight-of-hand, at the taking of samples, or swapping of samples, and verification of identity, so the results are forensically admissible. In a standard paternity test that includes the mother, child and man alleged-to-be the father, the DNA profile of the child is first compared to that of the mother to identify what the mother and child have in common using Punnet squares. Then the remaining components in the child's DNA profile must have come from the biological father. If the man being tested does not demonstrate those components in his profile then that would represent exclusionary evidence. If on the other hand, if the tested man does demonstrate those components in his profile, then that would represent inclusionary evidence. Therefore, a child is 50% related to both parents, and 50% related to it's siblings, assuming the siblings have the same mother and father.

Naturally occurring changes in the DNA can create an "apparent" single exclusion or inconsistency at one marker. They are rare but do occur and should be taken into account. For example, in comparing the SGM+ profile of a mother and her child, if at a single marker the mother and child did not share anything, but did match at the other 9 SGM+ markers, then that single inconsistency probably resulted from a mutation during oogenesis. About 1 in 30 DNA profiles will show a disparity between germ-cell line and buccal cell line for the same individual and one locus. As sperm, as such, would not be tested for a paternity test then the father could be falsely excluded in such a circumstance



This file contains many references to files on other internet sources. If the files have been removed, commonly newspaper sites
firstly- try The Internet Archive ( ww.archive.org)
secondly- try emailing me as I may well have an archived copy

Data Protection Act - Subject Access - Forensic Science Service


 Forensic Science Service 1

Text of the above letter:
An Executive Agency of the Home Office
Information Systems Division
Forensic Science Service
Trident Court
2920 Solihull Parkway
Birmingham Business Park
Birmingham B37 7 YN

Direct Line +44 (0)121 329---
Facsimile +44 (0)121 770 3686
02 January 2002 Subject Access Request
In response to your request for information under the Data Protection Act a search was carried out on the national DNA Database on 2 January 2002. The attached sheet contains the information that was retrieved from the Database. Under recently enacted legislation ,the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, there is no legal reqirement for a record to be removed from the National DNA Database provided the sample was lawfully taken. The details will only be used, however, for the for the (sic) prevention and detection of crime, for the investigation of an offence or for the conduct of prosecution (including crimes committed or prosecutions brought outside the UK ).

You have also requested information from our other database collections. The Forensic Science Service (FSS) are obliged to reveal the existence of all evidential material held by the FSS in a criminal case to the defence lawyer under the Criminal Procedures and Investigation (CPI) Act. The Data Protection Act gives you the right to information relating only to yourself; this is less than the information you are entitled to under the CPI Act. Under the Data Protection Act it is illegal to reveal information to you that relates to someone else. The nature of our records is such that a name and date of birth is not sufficient to ensure that the correct case records are retrieved for a subject access request. In order to retrieve the relevant information from our computers we require.
the date of the offence
the FSS case reference number
the year the case was processed
FSS laboratory where it was processed for each case that relates to you. Your legal representative should be able to supply you with this information; alternatively you may be able to obtain this information from the Police. It will take a considerable effort to retrieve the information from all the databases and copy it to you, I would be grateful if you would reconsider whether the information from the DNA Database is sufficient for your needs. However, if you do wish to obtain the information from the other databases please send me the case information specified above. Yours sincerely Dr. P E Cage and sig.
Chief Executive: Dr Janet Thompson
Headquarters :Priory House Gooch Street North Birmingham B5 6QQ Laboratories Birmingham Chepstow Chorley Huntingdon London Wetherby

A valid phone number in Dec 2001 for this lot is 0121 606 2950
So for my entry in the UK FSS National DNA Database ( NDNAD ).

 DNA profile

Text of the field designations and text of this form
Data Protection Act Subject Access Request
Search Name ; Search DoB ; Date of search
The National DNA Database is used for different types of data sources; consequently some of the following items may have no data recorded against them if it is not appropriate for the purpose for which the record mas(sic) made.
Name ; DoB ; Alias 1 ; Alias 2 ; Gender ; Country ; Paternity Id ; Ethnic Origin: White Skinned European ; Sample Barcode ; Sample Type 3 - Buccal cells ; Case Class Code:SA - Suspect Control from RCCJ recordable offences ; Case Reference ; Arrest Summons ; Batch Reference ; No in Batch - at NDU ; Gel Number ; Track No ; Test Type: 3 - 3rd Generation System (SGM+)
The following IDs are used to link personal details with the sample and amplified sample details. They have no meaning out side(sic) the National DNA Database. Person ID ; Sample ID
Each DNA sample is tested against a number of different DNA markers or Loci. Each test is expected to detect two values, one from each parent. Sometimes the same result will be obtained from both parents. The Amelogenin marker (Amel) is indicative of the persons gender.
Locus Type           Low      High
-------------------------------------
Amel                  X         Y
VWA                   1a        1b
THO1                  2a        2b
D6S502                3a        3b
FGA                   4a        4b
D21S11                5a        5b
D18S51                6a        6b
D2S1338               7a        7b
D16S539               8a        8b
D19S433               9a        9b
D3S1358               10a       10b

End of Form

All the actual numbers (weeded) labelled b in the right hand column, are greater or equal to, the numerical values in the middle column marked with "a".

The second line of text on the above covering letter ending "the record mas made". THIS IS A DYSLEXIC ERROR - letter reversal/inversion - not a typing error, w and m are nowhere near on a keyboard (also occurs in dyslexics concerning letters u and n, d and b etc). The other indicator for dyslexia is this erroneous initial letter is the same as the initial letter of the next word. Typing letter q, e, a, s or d instead of w is just sloppy fingers on the keyboard a letter m indicates a sloppy mind. If this person is involved with the likes of labelling DNA samples or batches then god help us. "for the for the" shows lack of proof-reading / lack of managerial supervision.
What do defence attourneys make of such evidence of incompetence when it arrives on their desks from this country's supposed leading national forensic laboratory. On 14 January 2002 I received another recorded letter from this lot in Birmingham. Enclosed was the same 2 sheets as previously; a printout from the DNA database and a covering letter that the incompetent Dr P E Gage put his signature to. The only differences (same 2 spelling/proof reading errors) was change of date and natural variation of signature or very subtle mimiograph of course. These incompetent idiots don't even know that what they think is D6S502 on the 6th chromosome is in fact D8S1179 on the 8th chromosome. Only one of the 10 markers used in the UK NDNAD - begs the question - What technical competence do these bods have ? If this is representative of the competence of Birmingham Forensic Science Service then all I can say is be grateful the UK no longer has capital punishment.
The above DNA profile form is appallingly constructed.
To a layman the X and Y at the top of the columns suggest that the numbers tabulated below the X refer to data from the X chromosome and under Y from the Y chromosome, which is erroneous. The reader of such a table, without any previous knowledge, would assume the figures under the X would relate to the X chromosome and Y chromosome under the Y with immediate implications to blood relatives. The amelogenin row should be removed from the table and placed elsewhere.

http://www.informationcommissioner.gov.uk/cms/DocumentUploads/Report%20Parts%201&2.pdf
Page 33 e. s.
There are 2 citations to some of my internet files " (Ref) 97
Subject Access Request form to the Forensic Science Service lodged in 2002 under the Data Protection Act. An example of this form can be found at http://www.nutteing.50megs.com/dnapr.htm "
this one is now knocked out because of corrupt persons lying to the web hosts 50megs.com, no communication from 'agrieved' direct to me of course. It just means 3 more websites opened up to replace that one knocked out.
The UK Forensic 'Science' Service will not supply this information as well as a lot more significant stuff. No one at the Information Commission asked my permission to link across to my site. I had transcribed as well as put an image of this information that had cost me 10 GBP. Honourable people who have contacted me for cross-linking permission have not only had it granted but also I've advised them on how to get around the fact that there is no permanence can be assumed for any of my sites. I'm not too concerned about cross-linking, as if I was, I would have made sure everything was not in simple ASCII text files. The files are there precisely for public access.

Some history of the UK NDNA database

45,000 profiles in the database in 1991
135,000 in 1995
300,000 in 1998
840,000 in spring 2000
over 1 million in 2001
1,886,000 25 March 2003
[Germany had 36,000 in its BKA DNA database in spring 2000 ]
Up till 2002 the figures for false DNA match was about 1 in 500,000
February 2003 dropped to about 1 in 330,000
May 2003 dropped to about 1 in 240,000
If the 'Milly Dowler' case was a false match then the figure drops to about 1 in 200,000 - going down fast now.
"Operation Ruby", reported on http://www.itv.com/news/2093001.html August 08,2003 concerning an implicated parishioner of St Paul's church ,Ryhope,Sunderland.
'Milly Dowler'

Cases Highlighting Problems with DNA Profiling

The following is a serious cock-up of this technology from New Zealand
New Zealand farce 26/5/1999 William Fleet murder
New Zealand farce continued 10 Mar 2000
And announcement of a NZ government inquiry at the end of this NZ government file
New Zealand followup
New Zealand farce a bit more
I have not found electronically retrievable reference to this report yet.
Houston tale of leaking roof over "forensic" DNA processing area
And the consequential chaos that ensued which in the States is a life and death matter, with bods on death row, because of DNA profiles processed under holes in a roof.
Houston 07 March 2003, "Seeking an order for a moratorium"
Houston DNA Re-testing 10 Mar 2003
Exposé of USA DNA crime labs as of 26 May 2003
Continued as a sort of weblog with other related news stories on Usenet uk.legal under title: DNA in the Dock.
http://tinyurl.com/3vdpw or as original URL
http://groups.google.co.uk/groups?hl=en&lr=&ie=UTF-8&safe=off&th=893334638df17df9&rnum=1
Insight - Inside the DNA Labs


From Ireland
http://www.online.ie/news/viewer.adp?article=%203040050
Man freed after DNA evidence deemed not enough
Quote
2003-10-14 : A Dublin man on trial for murder walked free today when the Central Criminal Court jury was directed to acquit because DNA evidence alone could not be relied upon. Mr Justice Butler's direction to the jury to acquit on murder and firearms charges followed defence submissions that, as there was no corroborative evidence to support the DNA evidence, the jury should be instructed to acquit the accused Frederick Howe. ...
End Quote

A couple of earlier cases from New Scientist
The Case of Roy Williams
The Case of Terence Hammond


False Matches

An 'incriminating' DNA profile is NOT DNA it is : A set of numbers that may or may not reflect the biology of a miniscule subset of someone's DNA that has been matched, or substantially partial matched via a computer database to the same set of numbers derived from a crime-scene sample stored, more than likely in less than ideal circumstances, which may or may not reflect a miniscule subset of the DNA of someone, not necessarily the offender, left at a crime scene maybe decades previously and analysed degraded , decades later. There is an absolute best error rate for single kit analysis of 1 in 140 being wrong.
The Case of Raymond Easton or Internet archive source was on http://www.thisiswiltshire.co.uk/wiltshire/archive/2000/08/15/swindon_news10ZM.html
the severely disabled 'cat burglar' from Swindon,Wiltshire,the case that led to the police having to increase the number of markers ( loci ) tested from 6 to 10 in the UK DNA profiles
A second case where unbelievably someone was sentenced to 6 years in prison for having a "DNA match" after a trawl through the FSS database and the following "corroborative evidence"
"The prosecution relied upon some matters as providing support: firstly, that the applicant was a smoker or, more accurately, that he had admitted in interview that he had been on his way to purchase a packet of cigarettes; secondly, the Crown said it was relevant that the applicant lived in the general locality of the burglaries (Birmingham); and thirdly, that the appellant was a man and most safe crackers were male. " Just because some fag butts were found at the Scene-of-Crime - ask yourself - How many professional burglars hang around smoking a cigarette while on a job ?
The Case of Robert Watters,Birmingham
Primary source for the Watters appeal court judgement is on Butterworths Lexis Nexis.

From the Court of Appeal judgement concerning Regina v. Watters heard on 19 Oct 2000
Quote
The other evidence results from more stringent tests that have been done on the DNA material that was available in this case. That is partly as a result of a case in which a 6 point match was found to produce two possible suspects, one of whom had been charged despite living at the other end of the country and had to be acquitted when it was appreciated that the DNA matched a second person.
End Quote

A false match in the USA
http://www.suntimes.com/output/news/cst-nws-dna01.html
Quote
DNA links crime to woman with alibi -- she was in jail
November 1, 2004
At first, police thought blood taken from the scene of a North Side burglary solved the crime because of a DNA match linked to a woman's genetic profile. But it turned out the woman had a solid alibi: She was in prison at the time of the break-in about two years ago, authorities said. ... "We don't know if the bloodstain is related to the burglary," said Hovey, who did not know the details of the case. "But DNA is only going to prove presence. It is not necessarily going to prove someone committed a crime." Lincoln Hampton, a State Police spokesman, said the state lab was looking into the case. "They are reviewing that case and will present their findings to the Chicago Police," he said. The burglary in the 1300 block of West Eddy was among a pattern of about 70 break-ins that police have been investigating.
End Quote
A Case Devastating to the FSS
A story from 14 Feb 2003 that confirms the worst aspect of the above ,the case of -
Peter Hamkin of Liverpool
Implicated as a murderer in a murder that occurred in Florence,Italy a thousand miles away.
and then
Peter Hamkin follow-up 17 Feb 2003
It seems patently obvious to me but to few other people that this is another case of an unrelated false match.
Peter Hamkin follow-up 10 March 2003
and the second page of the article.
I was proven correct .
MAKE AS MUCH NOISE AS POSSIBLE ABOUT THE PETER HAMKIN CASE
The Italians use 13 loci, 8 of which are the same as the UK set of loci, so maybe 8 loci match - we will have to wait and see what emerges about the case. As Peter Hamkin was arrested in 2001 his profile would have been on 10 loci.

The only newspaper, of January 2004, that has caught on to all this is Le Monde (23 dec 2003)
http://www.lemonde.fr/web/imprimer_article/0,1-0@2-3226,36-346852,0.html
At least they would appear to use the term false positive matches. I object to the term adventitious match as there is nothing accidental about all this - it is criminal 'scientific' incompetence at best and corruption at worst.

Now there is an Interpol hook-up this disgusting activity will become more and more common unless campaigners like me put a stop to it. I have seen an unconfirmed report that this "match was made" using 6 loci from the Italian profile and 6 from Mr Hamkin's FSS 6 loci profile. So these dangerous bastards have painted themselves even blacker if they, post-Easton, are still making uncorroborated "matches" on 6 loci. Mark Minick http://www.dailymail.co.uk/pages/live/articles/news/news.html?in_article_id=512980&in_page_id=1770 and http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article3423450.ece "Last year detectives reinvestigating a case of rape got a DNA profile from a strand of hair caught in a ring worn by the victim. The DNA identified Mark Minick, who was charged with the rape. Yet when the case arrived in court, it fell apart. Minick is white, small and slim – while the victim had described her attacker as black, large and tall. She is thought to have picked up Minick’s hair by chance from a blanket in the hospital where he had worked. " From my computer simulation of a large DNA profile database
A simulation of a large DNA profile database - the result being a match on 10 loci in just 2 million 'parthenogenic' profiles i.e. no kinship, relatedness, co-ancestry
of an astounding result. The UK FSS were using 6 loci ,as the forensic statistitians were telling them, chance of false match 1 in 37 million. But I now know that if they had continued to the (2003) total of 2 million in the NDNAD then there would be more than
27,168 pairs of false matches
1,231 triples
110 quadruples
14 quintuples
If the square law applies to multi-millions then for the whole UK population and 6 loci profiles then this result would scale to be 17 million pairs of matching profiles within 50 million people.
For an interesting exploration and derivation of this "Square Law" look in the Usenet 2003 archives for group "uk.legal" or "alt.sci.math.probability" and thread titled "Prosecutors fallacy revisited "

Derivation of the Square Law concerning DNA databases.
Acknowledgement to PeteM ,02 July ,2003
Arrange the N members of the population in a list m1, m2, .... mN.
The probability of a profile match between two members selected at random is i.
The expected number of matches between m1 and subsequent individuals in the list (m2,m3,m4 ...) is (N-1)i
The expected number of matches between m2 and subsequent individuals in the list (m2,m3,m4 ...) is (N-2)i.
And so on. So the total number of expected matches (including triples etc) is
[sigma from j=1 to j=N] {i*(j-1)} = iN(N-1)/2 ~ 0.5iN^2

General formula for deriving the minimum number of profiles in a database before false matches occur
Starting with a simpler analogue
Consider a 10 faced loaded dice with weighting such that face 0 or face 1 have a probability of 0.2 each face 2 or 3 , probability 0.15 each and faces 4 to 9 , 0.05 each
Toss 10 times and record the 10 digit number Repeat n times. Determine a number N where a repeat of a previously occuring 10 digit number will occur.
The probability of a random pair of single digits matching is sum of squares = 2(.2^2) + 2(.15^2) + 6(.05)^2 = 0.14. The digits in each of the 10 positions are independent, so the overall probability of all 10 digits matching is ( sum of squares )^10 ~= 2.893e-9, and call p.
To generate N numbers, there are N(N-1)/2 pairs of numbers which must all be different to avoid a repeat. If the pairs were independent then the expected number of repeats would be pN(N-1)/2, which will be 1 when N is about 26,000. The pairs won't actually be independent, but this estimate for the expected value should be fairly close for N << 1/p.
N = SQRT(2/p)
By comparison, if the numbers were unbiased then about 1 repeat in the first 140,000 numbers.
Now convert to factor-in directed pairs
If all pairs were directed then the new directed pair (dp) probability would by, taking 2 at a time, be dp = 2p*p but the pairs 00,11,22 etc are not directed so 2p*p is inflated by the probability of just the doublets so deduct this factor from the fomula.
The factor dp now becomes (2 * 0.14^2 - 0.14^3)^5.
Now convert to the DNA profile situation and formula becomes
For n loci 1..... 5 (6,9,10,13,15 or any number)
and m (valid) alleles at each locus and 2 per locus.
So Allele Frequencies are AF1 ..... AFm
Let Sn be the sum of the squares of AFs at locus n
ie Sn = AF1^2 + AF2^2 +...... + AFm^2 for each n
Let Qn = Sn^2 for each n
Let p = (Q1 * Q2 * .... * Qn ) [(2-S1) * (2-S2) * .... * (2-Sn)]
Then N = minimum number before finding a match is
N = SQRT (2/p)

Applied to different jurisdictions usage of DNA profiles

For 6 loci results using UK Caucasian AF data
Locus Sn Qn (2-Sn)
vWA 0.1938 0.0376 1.8062
THO1 0.2195 0.0482 1.7805
D8 0.1974 0.039 1.8026
FGA 0.1341 0.018 1.8659
D21 0.1673 0.028 1.8327
D18 0.1236 0.0153 1.8764

so p = 5.45 * 10^-10 * 37.2 = 2.027 *10^-8
and N =approx 9,900 for 6 loci

For 10 loci the extra factors are
Locus Sn Qn 2-Sn
D2 0.1213 0.0147 1.8787
D16 0.2218 0.0492 1.7782
D19 0.2379 0.0566 1.7621
D3 0.2068 0.0428 1.7932

So new p' = p * (2-S1)(2-S2)(2-S3)(2-S4) * (Q7 x Q8 x Q9 x Q10 )
p' = 2.027 * 10^-8 * 10.56 * 1.752 * 10^-6 = 3.75 * 10^-13
and 10 locus N =approx 2.31 million
Simulations gave about 1.8 million

Australian 9 loci , for Capital Territory Caucasian
Locus Sn Qn 2-Sn
D3 .2056 .04227 1.7944
vWA .1861 .03463 1.8139
D5 .3006 .09036 1.6994
D8 .1971 .03885 1.8029
D18 .1205 .01452 1.8795
FGA .1419 .02014 1.8581
D21 .1585 .02512 1.8415
D13 .217 .04709 1.783
D7 .1763 .03108 1.8237

p = 5.525 * 10^-14 * 208.5
= 1.152 * 10^-11
so N = approx 420,000


USA 13 loci Caucasian using RCMP data
Locus Sn Qn 2-Sn

D3 .2068 .04277 1.7932
vWA .1958 .03834 1.8042
D8 .196 .03842 1.804
D5 .2954 .08726 1.7046
D13 .212 .04494 1.788
D7 .1952 .0381 1.8048
D16 .2468 .06091 1.7532
FGA .1405 .01974 1.8595
D21 .1651 .02726 1.8349
D18 .1279 .01636 1.8721
THO1 .2194 .04814 1.7806
TPOX .3802 .14455 1.6198
CSF1PO .275 .07563 1.725

p = 2.656 * 10^-15 * 1788.8
= 4.751 * 10 ^-15

N =approx 20.5 million
Simulation gave a figure >10 million

Returning to Australia and Northern Territory Aborigine data
Locus Sn Qn 2-Sn
D3 .2618 .06854 1.7382
vWA .2129 .04533 1.7871
D5 .2201 .04844 1.7799
D8 .1652 .02729 1.8348
D18 .1312 .01721 1.8688
FGA .133 .01769 1.867
D21 .147 .02161 1.853
D13 .2558 .06543 1.7442
D7 .2586 .06687 1.7414

p= 1.1822 * 10^-13 * 199.2
= 2.3549 * 10 ^-11
N = approx 290,000

Scaling the AF tables for the high AF situation and 
then using the minimum number for matches formula 
produced the following. That then gives agreement with 
the only available published data on false matches which 
were back in mid 1990s for 6 loci profiles.

Calculated minimum numbers for sub-sets of profiles like 
mine of > 8 per cent AFs , also for >3 per cent ,Codis case.
6 loci UK Caucasian for >8% then 2,400
**********
10 loci UK Caucasian for >8% then 280,000
********** Best estimate so far ( before the Arizona data emerged) using the Cardiff/London  data of the 
last reported matches in the 6 loci NDNAD and scaling to 10 
loci situation , declaring 3 to be false matches and 7 to be due 
to aliases in the 10 matches in 6311 profiles. Applying the square law then 
for a 2.7million NDNAD database ( 2.7/0.28 )^2 = about 90 false matches.
So 1 in 30,000 just for a population of 2.7 million let alone 
the whole population, much less than 1 in 1 billion.
9 loci Australian Caucasian for >8% then 44,000
9 loci Australian Aborigine for >8% then 21,400
13 loci USA Caucasian for >8% then 2 million 
13 loci USA Caucasian for >3% then 10.2 million

There is still the square law where doubling of the number of profiles quadruples the number of matches. To go any further, to bring into the real world, I need minimum allele frequency to ancestral background correlation data, which is not in the public domain AFAIK. Unknown half-brothers (wrong side of the blanket) reduce the number N even more as also any cross-linking of loci and allleles.
This is my attempt to explain the Arizona partial DNA profile matches. Requiring the use of the simple and neat but surprisingly accurate "Jan Haugland" approximation for non-integre factorials via the Gamma function and back to factorial notation. (n+a)! == n! * (n + (1+a)/2 )^a or a Gamma Function Calculator on the net. For various coefficients of relationship (C of R) so statistical combinations of eg 6.5 from 9 ( for brothers, CofR =1/2 so 13/2) as well as 9 from 13 so numbers like 6.5!, 3.25!, 0.5! etc For a C of R of 0.0385 or 0.5/13, half a locus co-ancestry on average, T9 (for > 5.6 per cent, CofR 0.5/13) = 2.6 * 10^-11.
134, 9 loci matches
22.4 , 10 loci matches
2.2, 11 loci matches
0.07 , 12 loci matches
T10 = 1.44*10^-11, T11 = 3.9*10^-12.
On top of that it is only required to add 2 or 3 people from one consanguinous family so increasing the C of R to 7/8 , to supply the related 11 and 12 loci matches. T9 (for > 6 per cent, CofR 0.4/13) = 3.6 * 10^-11.
149, 9 loci matches
39 , 10 loci matches
3.1, 11 loci matches
"Avoid Saying that 13-Locus Profiles are de facto Unique"
The Arizona Data from the Kathryn Troyer disclosure http://www.nlada.org/Defender/forensics/for_lib/Documents/1148592247.61/Myers%20CAC%20Presentation.pdf is 144, 9 loci matches; 22 , 10 loci matches; 2 related 11 loci matches and 1 related 12 loci match in 65,493 , 13 loci DNA profiles. That is 144 inclusive of 120 9 loci, 22 10 loci , and 2 10/11 loci. It is impossible , by anyone's maths to get those 11 and 12 loci related matches by normal human mating. My maths involves using the formula for the first match , from the loaded dice derivation, but gradually ignoring the minor alleles , rescaling to give an AF sum of 1 and re-processing until the maths agrees with reality. Total anathema to forensic 'scientists' but DNA matches only involve the small sub-set of people with ALL large allele frequencies (like my own DNA profile, presumably because at least 3 generations of ancestry from only 2 counties). Not necessarily the largest at any locus but cerainly not any of the minor ones. For the Arizona near-match above my T13 value was determined by ignoring all AFs ( allele frequencies from the RCMP site ) less than 5.6 per cent . The simulated populations below used 6 per cent as the cut-off. My "coefficient of allelic co-ancestry" for the Arizona simulation above is T13 = 3.6 * 10^-14 for 13 loci Thence via the square law the minimum number of unrelated CODIS profiles before an evens chance of 1, 13 loci match is SQRT (2/T) = 7.4 million Then scaling T by 715, 286, 78 etc for T9, T10,T11 etc, partial matches and then scaling by the non-integre combination factors for 1/2 , 1/4, 1/8, 1/26 etc shared DNA. The bounds for T13 restrict it to the range of allele frequencies to be >5.6 per cent to > 6 per cent (CofR in range 0.4/13 and 0.5/13 ) to give the unrelated 9 loci mastches to be less than 144 on the one hand and not more than 0.6666 unrelated 11 loci matches on the other.
So for T9 = the T for 9 loci, x9 = number of 9 loci matches, n = half the square of the population being considered, C(2.5,9) the number of combinations of 2.5 from 9 because 6.5 (13 loci/2) match as brothers say. Then x9 = T9 * n * C(9,13) * C(2.5,9) Attemps to simulate a population to give the Arizona 144,22,2,1 numbers did not work. Even if there was as much as 2.5 percent cousin- cousin marriages (USA generally less than 1 percent) that would only contribute a single 9 locus partial match. It is a juggling optimisation exercise with the main constraints being: I've allowed the maximum of 11 loci unrelated partial matches to be less than 0.6666 so less than one when summed and rounded, precludes putting the co-ancestry coefficient too high. For related matches , 11 loci, > 1.3333 to give 2 when rounded, precludes increasing the related numbers too high. I've made sons and brothers non-exclusive to a certain extent so say 59,000 unrelated plus 6,000 (fathers and sons F+Ss) and 4,000 brothers ( B+Bs ) can sum to 65,000. I've also added a cross-component of random matches between the related and untrelated sections, to the unrelated side, relatively minor, but considered. Target from the Arizona data 144 pairs at 9 loci 22 pairs at 10 loci 2 pairs at 11 loci 1 pair at 12 loci
......... Unrelated / F+Ss / B+Bs / .... Totals
.......... 59,000 ...6,000 .. 4,000 ... 65,000
9 loci... 54.3 ...... 26.9 ... 19.9 ... 101.1
10 loci . 8.7 ....... 12.4 ... 4.7 .... 25.8
11 loci . 0.64 ...... 1.33 ... 0.6 .... 2.6
12 loci . 0.02 ...... 0.05 ... 0.02 ... 0.09
One 12 loci match is easily added by the use of one 7/8 consanguinity pair of grandfather and grandson via incestuous son and daughter mating. Changing to the following gives a better match but I do not know how to increase the 9 loci figures without increasing the 10 loci figures outside the bounds. Cousin matches do not work either.
......... Unrelated / F+S / B+B / .... Totals
.......... 59,000 ...1,000 .. 5,500 ... 65,000
9 loci... 54.3 ...... 1.0 ... 51.1 .... 106
10 loci . 8.7 ....... 0.46 ... 12.1 .... 21.3
11 loci . 0.64 ...... 0.05 ... 1.27 .... 1.96
and adding a 7/8 consanguinous pair for the
12 loci match.


So the simpler simulations using a non-Bayesian coefficient of co-ancestry of order of about one allele in 26 gives the closer results, unless anyone has any ideas how to juggle a hypothetical population of fathers, brothers, cousins, etc.

It beggars belief that the FSS had such faith in 6 loci right up to the Raymond Easton case that forced the issue.

The best estimate I could come up with (before the Arizona data emerged) from my simulations for the NDNAD matches within the so-called CJ Criminal Justice section in 2004 is:
Between 2 and 80 pairs of 10 loci profile matches
Between 4,800 and 92,000 within the pre-year2000 6 loci pairs of matches
Between 27,000 and 420,000 , 6 loci pair matches between and within the original pre-2000 set and 6 loci subset of the post-2000 10 loci profiles
The upper and lower bounds are set by absolutely no inter-relatedness so artificially low at one end and all profiles having all 4 grand-parents born in England which is artificially high. The upper bound also correlates with taking the criteria for the published 6 loci matches in the NDNAD and scaling to ther 10 loci situation.
Doing similar calculations for the case of using degraded DNA where it has been stored at ambient temperature and humidity. The 'heavy' fractions progressively fail to amplify giving a forensically unusable result for those loci, ignoring whether it is forensically admissible to be able to rely on the still active components in that situation (no validation study - neonatal samples , say, stored at ambient , profiled and cross-compared to the same now adult persons traced and re-sampled and compared ). The first affected is D2 followed by D18 and then D16 and FGA about equally. For the most robust 7 loci used in the SGM plus system unrelated false matches start occuring after about 5,300 so with a NDNAD of 2.7 million then about 260,000 such 7 loci matches. For the most robust 8 loci then matches start after about 14,800 so 33,000 such matches in the NDNAD. For the most robust 9 loci then 9 loci matches start after about 73,000 and so about 1,400 such matches within the NDNAD. While these matches are locked, unknown, in the database there is no consequence.

Latest estimate of the number of unrelated DNA profile matches within the NDNAD, October 2006

Previous disclosure of the Arizona data
http://www.maa.org/devlin/devlin_09_06.html
September 2006
"... A recent analysis of the Arizona convicted offender data base (a database that uses the 13 CODIS loci) revealed that among the approximately 65,000 entries listed there were 144 individuals whose DNA profiles match at 9 loci (including one match between individuals of different races, one Caucasion, the other African American), another few who match at 10 loci, one pair that match at 11, and one pair that match at 12. The 11 and 12 loci matches were siblings, hence not random. But matches on 9 or 10 loci among a database as small as 65,000 entries cast considerable doubt in my mind on figures such as the oft-cited "one in ten trillion" for a match that extends to just 3 or 4 additional loci. ..."

has now been clarified to
http://www.maa.org/devlin/devlin_10_06.html
October 2006
"... A study of the Arizona CODIS database carried out in 2005 showed that approximately 1 in every 228 profiles in the database matched another profile in the database at nine or more loci, that approximately 1 in every 1,489 profiles matched at 10 loci, 1 in 16,374 profiles matched at 11 loci, and 1 in 32,747 matched at 12 loci.

How big a population does it take to produce so many matches that appear to contradict so dramatically the astronomical, theoretical figures given by the naive application of the product rule? The Arizona database contained at the time a mere 65,493 entries. Scary isn't it? ..."

7 July 2006, on
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/forensic-science/messages
A forensic mathematician stated
"Incidentally, the expect number of 10
locus matches is 5, and matches of 11 or more loci are not expected."
before the later clarification of the Arizona data

184 pairs of unrelated false matches in the UK DNA database -
that is now the best estimate, October 2006, so far, using that Arizona data.
, further exploration of the Arizona data is on file dnas16.htm on this site.
The database structure used in the UK is 10 loci.
The Arizona data was for any 10 loci in the 13 of
the USA codis system. The number of permutations
of 10 from 13 is
13! / ( 10! * 3! ) = 286

There is a square law of match probabilities
so that the minimum number before one match is
more likely, than not, in a 10 loci database is
65493 * SQRT(286/22) <> 236,000
[ not 65493 * (286/22) ]

From the Arizona data, again square law applied
1 in 236,000 becomes (3.2/0.236)^2 = 184 pairs
in the current 3.2 million, 10 loci NDNAD database.

To give the lie to all that junk-science presented
in courts about probabilities in the trillions and bigger.
There is something of the order of 184 chances in
3.2 million for false matches. So 1 in 3.2 * 10^6 / 184
chance of an unrelated false match with someone else
of 1 in 20,000 for a 3.2m "population" , let alone half the
whole population (men or women).
That is for every 20,000 crime scene DNA profiles
determined and a match found to someone's
DNA profile on the NDNAD (criminal or non-criminal)
then 1 is likely to be a false match to
someone on the database.

For half (no amelogenin marker) of the UK population
of 30 million and square law fashion.
1 in 236,000 becomes 16,200 in 30 million or
1 in 1,850 chance of an unrelated false match with
someone else in the whole population.
There is a sort of inverted racism here. If you have a Jamaican grandfather or Polish mother or such like, in the last few generations of your ancestry, then you are fairly well protected from such unrelated false matches. For people, like myself, genetically dead common, then that 1 in 1,850 chance drops to 1 in 220 chance of an unrelated false match to men in that same subset of the whole population. Put the other way around about 26.5 million of the 30 million UK male population are fairly immune from unrelated false matches. Technically those 26.5m have at least one of their 20 alleles , of a full 10 loci SGM+ UK FSS DNA profile, having an allele frequency rarer than 6.6% Mine are all greater than 8% so even more in the firing line.

Can we be sure the Arizona data has not been nobbled like the FBI data,
prior to release ?

From a forensic mathematician
"Incidentally, the expect number of 10
locus matches is 5, and matches of 11 or more loci are not expected."
with no account for linkage/co-ancestry.

Using my routines, gives a figure of (between 4 and 8
because my result is 1 which is in effect >=1 and <2 )
rather than 5 in such
circumstances of mathematically pure randomness so
surprising agreement for 10 loci in 13.
So an increase to 22 matches for 10 loci gives a reasonable
quantification of co-ancestry.

I, too, cannot correlate the Arizona 9 loci match numbers and 10 loci
numbers.
If 22 off 10 loci matches then why only 144 off 9 loci matches.
Something like ratio of 144 to 22 is what I'd expect
for an ordered subset of profiles, not permutating any subset
eg results for a 4 million pc simulation with actual UK 10 loci
allele frequencies and mathematically pure randomness
with no "co-ancestry" factored-in
7 loci , 2,837 matches
8 loci , 243
9 loci , 21
10 loci , 4
That is ordered first 6 , first 9 etc not any 6,9 etc
so 9/10 ratio of 21 to 4, much like 144 to 22.

Also running a totally random simulation of 13 loci using published
Codis allele frequencies and doing a permutating
all combinations match check for the relatively
small number of profiles 32,500 (half the Arizona number)
because I don't own a mainframe or have access to fancy
mathematical routines
Results for a 32,500 Codis profiles simulation run
34, 9 loci matches for all permutations of 9 from 13
1, 10 loci match for all permutations , that one for
D3,vWA,D8,D5,D13,D7,D16,FGA,D21,D18,THO1,TPOX,CSF1PO
(16,20)(14,17)(12,14)(11,12)(11,14)(12,12)(12,13)(20,24)(29,30)(14,15)(6,9.3)
)(8,8)(10,12) and
(15,15)(18,18)(12,14)(11,12)(9,11)(12,12)(12,13)(20,24)(29,30)(14,15)(6,9.3)
(8,8)(10,12)

so 9/10 ratio of 34 to 1

Arizona demographics is not typical of a USA state
ww.rho.arizona.edu/Resources/DataLine/ArizonaPopulationCharacteristics.htm
but I don't really see why that should explain this anomaly.


In the R v. Watters appeal it was divulged that a scene of crime profile matched 2 separate 6 loci profiles belonging to 2 separate people ( not one person with an alias ). That should have shook things up somewhat. But it seems not to be appreciated that whenever there is a match between a scene of crime 10 loci-profile and a CJ record profile THEY always take that match as conclusive citing billion (or more ) to one probabilities against a false match. They don't wait 10 years say for a second record to match the first such occurance of that particular profile in the CJ database. To put it another way if all 60 million people in the UK had their DNA profile on the NDNAD then there would be more than 45,000 matches and that is unrelated matches not brothers or close relatives ( known or 'bar sinistere' ) which of course increases the match numbers even more.

The first, reported, case of a false DNA profile match, to someone in Goettingen ,Germany
DNA mystery in murder probe 27 May 2003 GOETTINGEN - German justice officials investigating a murder six years ago are faced with a baffling problem after a DNA sample appeared to confirm the killer. The sample prosecutors found in connection with the murder fitted the DNA profile of a 40-year-old man. But their sole suspect had the perfect alibi - he was in jail at the time. "This is a very mysterious affair," admitted Hanover public prosecutor Thomas Klinge. The September 1997 murder of a 61-year-old woman, whose body was left on a playground in Hanover after she had been beaten about the head with a stone, had baffled police for several years. But last year specialists achieved a breakthrough when they discovered small traces of DNA material on the victim's bicycle. A check of the BKA federal police department's DNA databank confirmed it matched the profile of a suspect with a previous record of violence and sexual offences. However, the man has been held at a high-security unit at Goettingen's closed mental health hospital since the middle of 1997. Officials at the unit have confirmed that it is absolutely secure. Director Gunter Heinz said he was "100 per cent certain" the suspect could not have left and returned. Klinge said there could be no doubt about the accuracy of the DNA sample which had been tested by several institutes. Neither was there any reason to believe the evidence had somehow appeared on the bicycle after the crime. But he added: "The alibi appears to be absolutely reliable, and we have no knowledge the man has an identical twin brother."
If this German was not incarcerated and had been at the time of the murder then he would have got the Easton/Hamkin treatment ,especially as this bod had a criminal record for violence and sexual offences.
The story, in German, in Die Welt
The Goettingen Prisoner story placed here for easy access
20 June 2003 and the 'Milly Dowler' serological sample in Surrey match with a Sunderland parishioner.
From Australia the first instance of an innocent female implicated as a murderer - the Werribee rape victim,October 2003
http://www.heraldsun.news.com.au/common/story_page/0,5478,7442645%255E2862,00.html
and http://www.heraldsun.news.com.au/common/story_page/0,5478,7433016%255E2862,00.html
"The accuracy of Victoria's DNA system will be on trial during the Jaidyn Leskie inquest next month. The Herald Sun yesterday revealed that DNA found on a bib Jaidyn was wearing the day he is presumed to have been killed matches the DNA of a rape victim. Police have interviewed the 22-year-old Werribee woman and say she is not connected with Jaidyn's disappearance.

There was unidentified DNA found on a bib Jaidyn was wearing the day he disappeared. The bib was found in a plastic bag, with some of Jaidyn's other clothing, in Blue Rock Dam near where Jaidyn's body was discovered in January 1998. All the obvious females who might have come into contact with the bib were DNA tested at the time. Jaidyn's mother nominated a number of other women she thought should be tested and the new investigation ensured each of these woman was checked.

None of them were found to be a match. As a matter of routine, the DNA from the bib was run through the police DNA database to see if it matched any of the thousands of DNA samples taken from criminals and victims and which are stored on the database. It turned out to match DNA obtained from the outside of a condom used by a rapist to rape a woman. Police have interviewed the 22-year-old rape victim and told the coroner they do not believe she was in any way involved in the disappearance of Jaidyn, but can't explain why her DNA was on Jaidyn's bib."

http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/12/15/1071336887491.html?from=storyrh
Later appraisal suggests this was another case of unexplainable lab cross-contamination. The police never explained why the rape victim could not be the murderer.

Which is the more reliable evidence ? "Evidence" from theoretical forensic scientists or evidence from real life such as Messrs Easton and Hamkin and the Goettingen prisoner.
This is the Birmingham FSS quoted in Forensic Science International 88 (1997) 33-42:
"In recent months we [the FSS] have had a very clear steer from the appeal court that forensic scientists should concern themselves with frequencies and be ready to present to the courts the probability of other individuals possessing the same profile. The UK population is about 60,000,000. The combined TGM and SGM statistics [now expanded to SGM+ ] translates to a frequency of 1 in 1,000,000,000,000,000 (in many billions)."

http://www.presstelegram.com/Stories/0,1413,204~21474~2300828,00.html
Article Published: Wednesday, July 28, 2004 - 8:35:45 PM PST
Quote
When analyzing DNA, forensics experts tend to talk about numbers rarely heard outside college classrooms and science laboratories. They use terms like quintillions (a number with 18 zeros), sextillions (21 zeros) and septillions (24 zeros).
And when it comes to matching DNA profiles, each zero matters. In the case of Mark Wayne Rathbun - the alleged Belmont Shore rapist - forensic serologist Thomas Fedor has calculated a chance of one in 844 septillion that someone other than Rathbun left his DNA on the left breast of victim Jane Doe No. 2 in May 1998.
End Quote

A prisoner, John Ruelas, implicated as a four-year-old in a rape and murder from mid Jan 2005
http://www.freep.com/news/metro/leiterman15e_20050115.htm
and
http://www.mlive.com/news/jacitpat/index.ssf?/base/news-11/110615430071040.xml

Part Quote
"I don't think it is a mistake. I think it is his blood," Washtenaw County Assistant Prosecutor Steven Hiller said. "The chances it wasn't him are astronomical." A state police DNA analyst said the chance of a random match is 1 trillion to one, Hiller said. Officials followed up the database match with fresh DNA samples from Ruelas with the same results, Hiller said.
End Quote
On which planet do they breed these forensic scientists ? If I spouted deluded statements like that in court I'd be locked up as a dangerous fantacist - at the very most 200 million DNA profiles have been determined over the whole earth up to now. Even then they are for incompatible systems so perhaps a maximum of only 20 million for any particular system. From my simulations and reasonable projections into nundreds of millions then even in the billions it would be a rarity to find a profile that does not match to someone else let alone heptillions/septillions. I niaively thought that evidence in courts had to be proven real world material.
The correct interpretation to give to court is give the actual number of known unrelated matches in a population or database , say the UK NDNAD. Then on a defendent's profile, allele by allele, and allele frequency basis for his ethnicity, show whether he is likely or unlikely to have a false match. Not surprisingly the UK government will not divulge how many false matches are in the arrestee side of the NDNAD (2.7 million of 2004) and the FBI removes matches from any data it gives to academe. If they did divulge the currently corrupt court con-job would collapse over-night.

Here is one way around the impasse without having to disclose the number of alias duplicate records there are. Although I would check 10 percent sampling say, of such matches , cross-comparing to at least mugshots. I know from recent work, simulating the other known bit of data, from Australia namely a report of 7 loci from 9 loci matches in order of 5,500 profiles that it is very computer time-intensive to check all permutations of 7 from 9 per profile against each other profile even in just 5,500. Go to millions and even with mainframes it would be a mammoth task. But checking just the first 7 or last 7 say of 9 loci profiles is quite straightforward. The results would still be useful for showing the number of unrelated false matches. Similarly for 10 or 13 loci databases
Note this is from straight simulation using all published alleles for UK caucasian population , totally randomly generated as though none had any parents and so no co-ancestry at all. Build that in and numbers go up but undetermined to any accuracy so far. Summary of results of matches in 4 million, on first x of 10 loci matches rather than any x of 10 loci on file dnas5.htm on URL below.
6 loci, 94,980 matches
7 loci , 2,837
8 loci , 243
9 loci , 21
10 loci , 4 matches
(21 of the 9 loci matches are also included in the 243 of 8 loci matches etc)
So I now play devil's advocate and say that those last 4 were not real random matches but the result of deliberate use of aliases and duplicate records. I simply remove those four which must of course be included ,by default, in the 9 loci matches and all the lower order ones similarly. As of course there are no errors in any DNA profile then 4 is maximum of deliberate alias duplicate occurances. So now the results look
6 loci , 94,976
7 loci , 2,834
8 loci , 239
9 loci , 17
Then it's just a matter of comparing similar match-checking routines over the real (10 loci) DNA database profiles. Just deducting the number of apparent 10 loci matches from the lower order matches. If the results are something similar then no unrelated false matches. If more like , say,
6 loci 200,000
7 loci 30,000
8 loci 2,000
9 loci 200
or even say,
6 loci, 500,000
7 loci , 100,000
8 loci, 15,000
9 loci , 2,000
quite legitimate inferences can be drawn , at the vey least a good figure to put on the co-ancestry factor.

From Australia the two cases of Nick Lisoff and Marc Renton (contains rather sloppy DNA terminology)

I would be interested in finding confirmation/clarification of any of the following broadcast on 04 Dec 2002 ,9pm on the Sci-fi TV channel in a documentary series this one programme entitled "DNA in the Dock" - [ A US anthropologist discovered a 14 point match between two unrelated people who lived 2000 miles apart. He mentioned that the two samples in question were from South America and Mexico respectively. There was also a mention of a perfect match in two non-family members of a certain small in-bred tribe consisting of a few hundred people [ full reference on my dnay.htm file ] . 300 "matches" in the UK NDNAD ascribed to mistakes,re-tested people giving aliases (an unrelated match of 2 DNA profiles and unrelated conventional fingerprints would be in the billions to one against) etc ].

From "trade" journal Forensic Science International 95 (1998) p30.
http://tinyurl.com/cx9ms (abstract only )
Concerning data in the UK DNA database as of 04 October 1996 when there were only 6311 samples from the London area and 573 from the Cardiff area.
"A small number of unresolved duplicate pairs of profiles were present in the regional data :10 pairs within the London region and 1 pair in Cardiff. The most common cause of duplicate entries is the use of aliases by suspects who have been arrested on several occasions. For administrative reasons ,it is not always possible to resolve such duplicates by exhaustive police investigation."
This statement is absolute tosh. At the same time a DNA sample is extracted, from an arrested person, his conventional fingerprints are taken as well. It could not be easier to cross-correlate conventional and DNA fingerprints from 2 data sets. The chances then of a false matching of both types of "fingerprint" would truly be in the trillions to one against. If just one of these 10 is a genuine unrelated false match then you can throw forensic statistics out of the window. Are they telling us that the police are unconcerned about having duplicate criminal records for one criminal - tell that to the fairies. I smell a cover-up of the most grave kind because it concerns people who consider themselves scientists not administrators/politicians and the like.
The PRIORITY is to fully investigate all such occurrances - I have a scientific background and I find the deliberate non-investigation of anomalies to be absolutely abhorrent and an affront to the scientific ethic. There is this incredibly dangerous mindset that they cannot have unrelated false matches so ring-fence them out of consideration.
Taking the above published data of 10 matches in 6311 profiles and using my database macros with UK caucasian data produced the following results.
Using >= 12% allele frequencies produced 56 pair matches in 6,311 6 loci profiles
Using >=10% simulation produced 20 pairs
Using >=8% produced 3 pair matches
So assuming only 3 of the 10 observed matches were unrelated false matches and 7 were repeats due to aliases, suggests a reasonable simulation is to use >=8% criterion. Until the FSS gets their fingers out and publishes the true situation then that is the best estimation so far. Then using this 8% criterion in the 10 loci situation produces the simulated results for the current, post year 2000, NDNAD revealed below.

Bear in mind this was from the situation as it was in 1996 to 1998 and is no different in concept now despite increasing from 6 to 10 loci tested. It is an absolute scandal that I seem to be the only person who seems to be investigating this appallingly lax state of affairs in forensic "science".

Some more examples of this arrogance or stupidity or conspiracy of silence
from http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/dnamtgtrans3/trans-h.html
" In Florida they say it's about 10 percent that they duplicate their samples, and 2 percent of those samples -- when the samples coming into the lab they look for duplicates. 2 percent get by. They have a different corrections number, they have a different name, they have a different Social Security Number, they have a different date of birth. So there are a large number of samples that go all the way through the testing process and it's not until they put them into their database that they realized they have duplicates "

From Forensic Science International 114, (2000) p7-20 p7 concernig 966 DNA profiles of Arabic persons.
Quote
We note that there is one duplicate pair of profiles in the Arabic data. Although we would not expect to see any genuine matches in a database of this size if they had originated from different and unrelated people (see Table 5 ), further investigations could not rule this out as a possibility. However, since the matching profile is composed of alleles which are among the most common at each locus, the allele proportion estimates are insensitive to whether or not one profile in the pair is discarded.
End Quote
Comment : It does not require simulations like mine to show that any unrelated matches are far more likely to occur between people with the most common alleles. It is precisely such profiles you would expect to have unrelated matches. Matching profiles containing a few rare alleles is likely to mean 2 profiles from the same person or 2 highly related people. My simulations (admittedly using UK caucasian data rather than Arabic ) shows that for totally random profiles you can expect one pair of unrelated matches in a database of 13,000, 6 loci profiles ( 94,000 6-loci matches in 4 million profiles) . For 8 per cent relatedness about 19,000 6-loci matches in 380,000 so about 1 in 2,700. This FSI report was in 2000 so they should have been aware of the very low probabilities using 6 loci. Anyway 1 in 966 is not so far removed from 1 in 2,700 and I would proffer that it was a case of un-related false match.

Fom Science,Vol 256,26 June 1992 p1743
Author Patrick J. Sullivan
Title : DNA Fingerprint Matches
Quote
I am writing to comment on two aspects of the report " On the probability of matching DNA fingerprints " by Neil J. Risch and B. Devlin (7 Feb,p717) . Risch and Devlin searched several large databases to determine whether there were any samples with matching patterns across a nummber of gene loci. They found " the probability of a matching DNA profile between unrelated individuals to be vanishingly small....." Last summer I was trying a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) case, Minnesota v. Johnson (1),and examined three FBI databases,C-3 (Caucasian),B-4 (black), and H-3 (Hispanic). During my examination,I discovered 25 apparent matches. Before my examination ,the existence of these matches had been known by only a few individuals connected with the FBI. Bruce Budowle of the FBI subsequently testified in Minnesota v. Johnson that he was aware of these matches and that they had been discovered when the FBI examined its database with its computer matching program. The FBI was able to verify that most of these matches occured because the Texas College of Osteopathic Medicine submitted more than one blood sample from the same individual. One false match was the result of sample handling error. The FBI also discovered three sets of matching samples from Florida. These samples were from the black and Hispanic databases. The FBI was not able to identify that the Florida matches were the result of duplicate submissions from the same individual or of submissions from identical twins. Budowle then asked Cellmark Diagnostics (German- town,Maryland ) to examine the matching samples. Its probes also yielded unclear results. The Florida matches were then deleted from the databases,even though there was no explanation for their occurance. The FBI again revised its databases in January 1992. The new databases are designated C-4,B-5, and H-4. Budowle testified (2) that all the matches have been edited out of these databases and that this removal is justified because it is not possible for two individuals to yield identical profiles when as many as seven probes are used. My first point is this: Of what scientific value is a paper that seeks to draw any conclusion from the fact there are no matches in a database when the matches have been removed from the database before the analysis is done? The FBI's removal of matches from its databases before giving them to outside scientists guarantees that those scientists' conclusions will support the FBI's "self-fulfilling prophecy." This is not an isolated practice. Budowle testified in United States v. Yee (3) that the FBI ran its match program over its South Carolina black database and found a large number of matches. The FBI's record- keeping was such that it could only speculate as to the cause of these matches. Again,the FBI removed them from its database. End Quote
No where is there mention of returning to the original pair samples and retesting on extra loci. A match in another 6 loci, say, then they would be in a very strong position to declare repeats rather than matches.

My MP agreed to table a written parliamentary question.
If submitted to parliament in the form I had envisageded then the reply would likely have come back as too complex or costly to answer. So more than likely, no reply - was my MP's (been there before ) helpful response.
He advised splitting into 2 questions over time. The first one to get the number of current DNA profile matches for whatever reason answered and written into Hansard. A figure of ???? or whatever would almost guarantee some sort of qualification referring to aliases. Then with any luck there may be more than me and my MP asking that this figure be resolved into the component parts. That is pairs of unrelated individuals with matching DNA profiles and same persons recorded twice or more using aliases.
From the Cardiff/London data of 10 matches in 6311 6 loci profiles that use-of-alias factor should remain constant whether 6 loci or 10 loci. So if 7 of those 10 were duplicates from use of aliases then 7 in 6311 scales to 3000 in 2.7m in the NDNA these days.
This is a copy of my letter to my MP as I had heard/seen nothing about it.
15 Nov 2003 by post and 05 Dec 2003 by hand.
" Dear Mr - ,
On 04 July 2003 I visited your surgery at - -. You agreed to ask a written Parliamentary Question. The form of the question to the Home Office was to be something of the cut-down nature, "How many DNA profile matches are within the UK NDNAD ? (National DNA Database)". I have not seen reference to the question or answer on the internet public accesss Hansard site or any follow-up communication from yourself "

Then 8 months later
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200304/cmhansrd/vo040211/text/40211w15.htm
or http://tinyurl.com/7dms5
This question and answer in Hansard
5 Feb to 11 Feb 2004
Quote
Dr. Whitehead: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many DNA profile matches exist within the UK national DNA database.
Ms Blears: The figures relating to the DNA profile matches reported by The National DNA Database since its inception in April 1995 to January 2004 inclusive are described as follows: a total of 459,903 matches have been reported between DNA profiles obtained from individuals and DNA profiles collected from unsolved crime scenes; and a total of 28,116 scene-to-scene matches have been reported between DNA profiles collected from unsolved crime scenes.
End Quote
Unfortunately not disclosing the far more significant number of matches in the CJ (arrestee ) side of the NDNAD. It does show there is a mechanism for showing the number of matches withina and only within the crime-scene profile database. So givebn the will the same mechanism should be applicable to the CJ database. But of course there is not the will because a major suction of the 'criminal justice' system would collapse overnight.

Then in Hansard, 29 April, 2004
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmhansrd/vo040429/text/40429w32.htm
or http://tinyurl.com/agqup
Criminal Justice Database
Dr. Whitehead: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department pursuant to the answer of 17 February, how many matches are contained wholly within the criminal justice section of the database. [165827]
Ms Blears: The National DNA Database is a criminal intelligence database and its use is restricted by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, as amended, to purposes related to the prevention or detection of crime, the investigation of an offence or the conduct of a prosecution. All of the matches referred to in the 17 February answer, either suspect-to-scene or scene-to-scene were made in the course of police investigations.
So even further away from the required answer.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm070710/text/70710w0008.htm
But they do disclose, July 2007 "It is currently estimated that 13.7 per cent of profiles held on the NDNAD are replicates, i.e. that a profile for a person has been loaded on more than one occasion (one reason for this is that the person gave different names, or different versions of their name, on separate arrests). Thus, the number of individuals on the database is approximately 13.7 per cent. less than the number of subject profiles. The presence of these replicate profiles on the NDNAD does not impact on the effectiveness and integrity of the database. Nonetheless, a long-term exercise is under way to identify issues associated with the removal of all such redundant replicate profiles." I would posit that the only way to this number of "errors" is if they are still "matching" on 6 loci.
and http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/politics/article2896193.ece
They originally thought that a system based on 6 "markers" was sufficient to give 1 in 37 million false match probabilities which was utter bollocks. There are somewhere between 300,000 and 840,000 6 marker profiles still on the database, not been expunged, now they are using 10 "markers" since 2000 which are the original 6 plus 4 more. So can still be "matched". The number of unrelated false matches just considering the 6 markers of the original 6 profiles and the 6 of the 10 marker profiles. For the present 3.2 million there would be between 100,000 and 2 million , 6 marker matches. 100,000 is the figure for a UK population where everyone is randomly generated without any of this pesky business of relatedness, so must be higher than that. There are also phenominal numbers of triple, quad, quintuple .... matches as well, for just 6 markers. So could easily be the majority of those 500,000 "replicate" reported profiles. Most of them being totally different people but matching on their DNA (6 marker subset of anyway) It seems very strange to me that they would rather blame sloppy administration, aliases etc rather come clean about still matching up 6 loci DNA profiles. "Nonetheless, a long-term exercise is under way to identify issues associated with the removal of all such redundant replicate profiles." If it was true, they would be throwing the baby out with the bathwater if they expunged the "wrong" entry from the database. They could not be arsed to do this ten years ago when it was reported in Forensic Science International 95 (1998) p30. http://tinyurl.com/cx9ms (abstract only ) Title: Regional genetic variation in Caucasians 10 in 6311 scales (log-law if false matches and linear if aliases) would not be hundreds of thousands now in 3.2 million if it was indeed use of aliases etc then. No reason to believe that criminal use of aliases has changed in 10 years so 10 in 6311 scales to only 5,000 such errors now. The DNA profiling business now uses barcoding and robotic processing etc to remove some of the human error so where has this massive increase of "errors" come from ? So they are not going to start now. As the vast majority will be false matches of 6 loci, ie 2 valid entries not people using aliases etc. For technical reasons "false homozygosity" 22,000 of the reference samples taken from arrestees are just plainly wrong, without any administrative errors. Again nowhere near 100,000s I have prima facie evidence that the FSS employs dyslexics , and also evidence that they do not obey lab cleanliness protocols but would not have worsened in ten years surely.

The next question will have to be more general and hopefully grab the attention of the conventional law and order mob. "What mechanism is in place to check using the DNA profile database the uniqueness of criminal records ? ie that one person does not have repeated criminal records but under different aliases"
Then after she replies that there is no system in place the follow-up question "Why not ?"

It is my contention that something like 1 in 75 of men in the UK are falsely accused and then prosecuted and convicted for rape precisely because thier 'DNA' from the NDNAD national database matches a crime-scene stain DNA profile. The DNA profile registered on the NDNAD is usually derived from cheek cells but the crime sample often consists of germ-cells (sperm). The following shows the mutation rates for male and female mutation rates for some of the commonly used DNA profiling loci.
http://www.cstl.nist.gov/div831/strbase/mutation.htm
For the 10 loci used in the UK then using that data and considering 100,000 profiles.
There would be 310 males with an anomalous FGA allele
8 for THO1
150...
130
150
110
220
150
70
40
Total 1338 in 100,000 would have one anomaly in their profile. So ignoring more than 1 mutation cases then 1.338 percent or 1 in 75.
That gives a lower bound until data for the presumably lower birth to adult male sperm mutation rate data is available, ie meiotic + mitotic rather than the AABB meiotic + mitotic + meiotic mutation rate. There is no reason to assume the people represented in the AABB data had any genetic disease before being profiled so a reasonable random human population cross section. A baseline mutation rate is 100 nucleotide mutations per 3.4 billion of the human genome per birth (L D Hurst)

False DNA match by Bone Marrow Transplant
Yet again another problem area highlighted because the suspect had the perfect alibi - he was in prison, how many others have not had such an alibi ?
http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=mg18825234.600
Bone marrow donors risk DNA identity mix-up
27 October 2005
IT SOUNDS like an open-and-shut case: a clear DNA match is made between semen from a serious sexual assault and a blood sample from a known criminal. Yet in a recent case from Alaska, the criminal in question was in jail when the assault took place. And forensic scientists had already matched the crime sample to the DNA profile of another person who was their prime suspect. It was only after careful detective work that the mystery was solved: the jailed man had received bone marrow from the suspect many years earlier.

A New Variant of Miscarriages of Justice


Moved to another file


2001 Criminal Justice and Police Act section 82


http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2001/10016--f.htm#82
Restriction on use and destruction of fingerprints and samples
(1) Section 64 of the 1984 Act (destruction of fingerprints and samples) shall be amended as follows.
(2) For subsections (1) and (2) (obligation to destroy fingerprints and samples of persons who are not prosecuted or who are cleared) there shall be substituted-
"(1A) Where-
(a) fingerprints or samples are taken from a person in connection with the investigation of an offence, and
(b) subsection (3) below does not require them to be destroyed, the fingerprints or samples may be retained after they have fulfilled the purposes for which they were taken but shall not be used by any person except for purposes related to the prevention or detection of crime, the investigation of an offence or the conduct of a prosecution. "

Note it says "may be retained" not "must be retained"
The effect of this section 82 was confirmed directly, face to face, from the horse's mouth.- January 2002 I bumped into ,socially, the Home Office Minister, John Denham. Some leading opinion on section 82 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001.
John Yorke Denham gloating about his coup (New Scientist 24 August 2002 - "The Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 swept away the obligation on the police to destroy DNA samples taken from suspects who are acquitted, or where charges are later dropped or convictions quashed on appeal."
I have found nothing in Hansard relating to discussion of this section 82 in parliament so in my books that makes it an illegal imposition.
Helena Kennedy QC on this matter If this article fails to emerge from the Guardian archive then click again.

Sir Alec Jeffreys,inventor of DNA profiling on this matter If this article fails to emerge from the Guardian archive then click again.
Also quoted in a New Scientist article of 05 May 2001
"Deep down they (police authorities) believe that innocent people who've had a brush with the law are more likely than not to be criminals... There is only one way to prevent any abuse (returning to the samples later in a trawl for data matching with physical characteristics say) of the DNA samples - destroy them all after a DNA sample has been obtained... Any checking of results should be carried out on a fresh sample obtained from the suspect... Suspects who are cleared should have the right to remove their DNA profiles or more radically the database should contain everyone's DNA profile,filed at birth."
Sir Alec Jeffreys more recently on this matter


I sent a proper request to FSS Birmingham but they refused to destroy my DNA sample and the derived biometric data.
I have had one of my civil liberties removed by this Dr P E Cage. I did not volunteer to have a DNA sample taken from me and as I have no criminal record I do not see any moral justification for them keeping it.
The only reason to have my DNA profile permanently on record is to stitch me up with a crime at some indeterminate point in the future - via falsely matching it to some scene-of-crime sample.
On 13 March 2002 there will be a test case on section 82 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001. It is against Yorkshire Constabulary, conducted by Howells Solicitors of Sheffield, acting for a Michael MARPER. The grounds being that it be read incompatible with article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and must be read down. They can only retain finger-prints,DNA samples etc if there is original and compelling reason e.g. another criminal case.
The following is an update on the high court test case published 23 March 2002 where the background material almost looks as though it was lifted from this file.
Section 82 ,CJPA 2001 Test Case If the article fails to emerge first time click again
Section 82 ,CJPA 2001 Appeal court decision by Justice Leveson and Justice Rose 22 March 2002 , now http://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/markup.cgi?doc=/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2002/478.html http://www.statewatch.org/news/2007/nov/echr-marper-submissions-15-03-07-final.pdf APPLICATION NOS. 30562/0430566/04 IN THE EUROPEANCOURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS BETWEEN: (1) 'S' (2) MARPER Applicants -v- THE UNITED KINGDOM "55. At para. 67 of the United Kingdom Government’s Written Observations on Admissibility and Merits it is indicated that samples (as well as DNA profiles and fingerprints) are put to “use for checks of identity” but this is factualy incorrect. In the Divisional Court and Court of Appeal it was stated that it is “esential to have some sample with which to compare the retained data” (para. 19, Divisional Court; para. 33, Court of Appeal). This is incorect. It is not essential to have some sample with which to compare the retained data: the retained data (the profile) is not compared to the retained sample. There appears to have been a misunderstanding in the domestic courts of the system’s operation in practice. " A fresh sample is taken.
More nasties concerning s82 of the 2001 CJPA from justices Waller,Woolf and Sedley
A Good Day to Bury Bad News
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm061213/text/61213w0010.htm
David Davis: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what percentage of those on the DNA Database have been convicted of a crime. [102427]
John Reid [holding answer 23 November 2006]: The National DNA Database (NDNAD) records the DNA profile for a particular individual. It does not hold data on arrest and criminal records. This information is held on the Police National Computer (PNC). Information provided by the Police Information Technology Organisation (PITO) from the PNC indicated that as at 14 July 2006, 2,922,624 persons on the NDNAD also had an entry on PNC. Of these, 2,317,555 (79.3 per cent.) had a conviction or caution (i.e. a criminal record). The difference between the two figures is attributable to: young persons under 18 who have a formal warning or reprimand recorded on PNC; persons who have been charged with a recordable offence where proceedings are ongoing; and persons who have been arrested for a recordable offence but no further action was taken.
http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/news/article-23378624-details/UK+police+get+access+to+over+one+million+DNA+records/article.do
UK police get access to over one million DNA records 17.12.06 But in a parliamentary answer last week, ministers said that of the 3,457,000 individuals on the database, just 2,317,555 had a criminal conviction or caution recorded on the Police National Computer. That means that 1,139,445 people have their personal details stored without having been found guilty of any crime.


The Wider Implications of DNA Profiles - the Attribution Problem


Beware! Police DNA database and postage stamps
Please be aware all criminals or non-criminals like me (courtesy of section 82 of the 2001 Criminal Justice and Police Act) who have had DNA samples taken from them and the profile placed permanently on the Birmingham Forensic Science Service (FSS) database.
DO NOT lick postage stamps before sticking on envelopes - use damp cloth or sponge.
As evinced in these files there are dangerous and corrupt people around who fabricate testimony and evidence to present to the police. It would have been very easy for any of my opposition to obtain stamps, licked by me ,and now, know my DNA profile is on this database. All they had to do was soak off a stamp. Then use it to dampen the gum on a fresh stamp, stuck to a "bomb threat" letter or smear on clothing to fabricate an "assault" or daub on a cigarette stub (previously smoked through a cigarette-holder) and leave it at a "burglary" or even a murder scene say. Cor! the perfect crime - murder one of your enemies AND get another of your enemies convicted for your crime. Forensic testers will look for the presence of DNA ,not be testing for the presence of gum unless pre-advised to do so . See http://u.tv/newsroom/indepth.asp?id=51700&pt=n the Sharon Houston case had to be quietly dropped, whoever rummaged in the domestic rubbish ended up with the wife's DNA rather than the husband and set up the wrong person , the Sharon Houston case, Ulster, 2004.
Previously, to do the same by lifting fingerprints and transferring to a crime scene artefact required substantial knowledge and skill. Now any old moron can falsely implicate anyone if they know they have been arrested and a DNA sample taken from them.

So a public information broadcast for all practising criminals who may read this file
The next time you go out to do a burglary or whatever. A simple way to reduce the chance of you being discovered and also mess up the forensic service more generally. Make a collection of cigarette stubbs,used snot rags /tissues etc from public areas and obtain used gloves, hats ,combs etc from jumble / rummage sales, garage / car boot sales or charity shops. Anything wil do because the police/ CPS are very imaginative - leave someone else's old sock at a crime scene and they will say it was intended for a soft cosh. Just wear latex gloves oneself, dampen the article of clothing and rub with the inside of a new latex glove is all the incriminating material required. Wheelie-bins/rubbish sacks would probably contain useful material. Then leave behind ONE of these items near your entry or exit point. DO NOT handle any of these items yourself, keep in a plastic bag until you "drop" it. If the Soco boys find a nice item covered in DNA they are more likely not to do the normal full range of dusting, casting and snapping and proceed to the next assignment. It is in the criminal's own interest to routinely do this as it diverts suspicion away from himself to some poor sod years later arrested for swatting a wasp or whatever is arrestable offence then. Anyone such as magistrates or judges or police who have annoyed, rightly or wrongly, anyone with criminal connections will have to be very careful how they dispose of their personal rubbish and detritus. I wonder what the going rate is for pubic hairs, retrieved by police station cleaners, from the urinals: see the Simon Hall / Joan Albert case. Get enough criminals to adopt this strategy and the national DNA database will be totally discredited. For rapists all you have to do is pick up recently discarded condoms from prostitute working areas. Place in your freezer and leave the unfrozen contents of one smeared on your next victim - use a condom yourself of course. Forensic scientists do not routinely check for previous freezing of such samples. They often place such SoCo exhibits in a freezer anyway.
Just shows how careful you have to be fabricating this stuff. No good wearing gloves yourself when you do the transfer if you're gloved hand also touches the nickers so transfering cells from the outside of the condom.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/crime/article/0,,1835971,00.html
Aug 2006,... The court heard how in order to substantiate her claims, which she made in a letter to the board of Dr Falkowski's hospital trust, Maria Marchese had obtained one of his used condoms from a rubbish bin and had transferred a specimen of his semen on to a pair of her own knickers. She handed the underwear to police and Falkowski was arrested, although the case against him was eventually dropped. "The professional consequences were devastating," Dr Falkowski told the jury: "I lost my private practice, my reputation was irreparably damaged." ...
"He added: "You have gone to the most extraordinary lengths of accusing him of rape and if it was not for DNA experts who established that the DNA found was from him and his girlfriend at the time, that could have left him with a prison sentence."" ..
and followup http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2-2366350,00.html The Times September 20, 2006
http://www.guardian.co.uk/letters/story/0,,1946935,00.html
Letters Tuesday November 14, 2006 The Guardian There is an even more worrying factor than having your DNA found accidentally at the site of a crime (Letter, November 7). This is that, if everyone's DNA is on record, criminals can easily and deliberately plaster a random person's DNA all over a crime scene. If only criminals' DNAs are on record, the rest of us can't be implicated. Let's keep things as they are. Professor Peter Gardiner
Masons solicitor multiple 28/03/2003
Surprisingly for a UK law firm it has details of how this pernicious proposal can be defeated by deliberately leaving other people's DNA at scenes of crime. "Databases on this scale change the nature of society. For instance, if a criminal were to deposit someone else's DNA sample at the scene of a crime, then that someone else might have to prove themselves innocent."
in original structure http://web.archive.org/web/20040610155000/http://www.out-law.com/php/page.php?page_id=policetoholddnap1048859438&area=news
No problem of implicating innocent citizens, as the police only use evidence, with guaranteed association with a crime or criminal - don't they!
http://www.newscientist.com/channel/being-human/mg18725163.800
10 September 2005
"Police in Manchester in the UK say that car thieves there have started to dump cigarette butts from bins in stolen cars before they abandon them. "

Even the police are now concerned how easy it is to 'fit-up' someone (police this time) by planting someone else's DNA at a crime-scene
From 17 Aug 2003
http://www.scotlandonsunday.com/scotland.cfm?id=902562003
Partial Quote
Police outrage over demand for their DNA

by JASON ALLARDYCE

PLANS to force police to give DNA samples have sparked a rebellion among rank-and-file officers. It is understood all eight of Scotland's police forces are about to demand that in future new recruits hand over samples to be included in a national genetic database. This would allow any body matter, such as hair or saliva, found at a crime scene, to be compared with the DNA records of officers, so investigations are not thrown off course through accidental contamination by officers working there. But rank-and-file police fear that calculating criminals with a grudge against members of the force could manipulate the system to damage the careers of innocent officers. Members of the Scottish Police Federation believe criminals could deliberately contaminate the scene with officers' DNA, either to implicate them in serious crimes or to give the impression that they had planted evidence. A federation spokesman said: "A point made by many of our members is that it is relatively easy for anyone so minded to obtain DNA traces of a police officer - for example from a discarded cigarette butt - and to deliberately contaminate a locus with it. "Apart from the suspicion which may or may not fall on the officer, it has the potential to diminish the evidential value of any DNA traces of the real perpetrator of the crime."
End Quote

In the full Scotland on Sunday article the policewoman McKie case and the disputed dermal finger-prints are referred to http://onin.com/fp/problemidents.html#second_case as high resolution images - interesting viewing
Another case of fingerprint wrong identification
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2004/02/02/ a_blow_to_the_credibility_of_fingerprint_evidence/
The FBI's Handling of the Brandon Mayfield Case (Unclassified and Redacted) the Madrid 'bomber' . An index to a report from the FBI showing how dangerous this cross-border fingerprint database nonsense now is
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0601/PDF_list.htm
a 30X bandwidth squandering set of pdfs over straight ASCII text. Another example of if you can't bury bad news then publish it in grossly inflated, scrappy quality , PDFs


Then from the criminal fraternity someone being implicated by person or persons unknown, presumably an enemy of his, in Exeter reported 14 Aug 2003.
http://www.thisisexeter.co.uk/displayNode.jsp?nodeId=101955&command=displayContent&sourceNod e=99871&contentPK=6705317
Quote
A man accused of burgling a city home after bloody tissues found at the scene matched his DNA profile has been cleared by a court. Jonathan Bowskill said he had nothing to do with the burglary at Alpha Street, Heavitree, in the early hours of November 29. A jury at Exeter Crown Court yesterday found him not guilty. During the trial, prosecutor David Evans said Peter Holmes went to bed and left a window open and his wallet in his leather jacket. He got up at 5am and went to work. He later found the tissues on the floor and his wallet missing. Bowskill told police although he was a heroin addict, he "didn't do burglaries", and did not know how the tissues came to be there.
End Quote

This one I've not found reference to the woman involved being prosecuted for attempt to pervert the course of justice or whatever. It may be just reported fantacising by the prosecution to explain a very awkward situation. But I've included anyway.
Turner was charged with three rapes last year after police matched samples of his DNA to that from fluids found on the victims. Turner claimed he was innocent. He acknowledged that the genetic material taken from the rape victims matched his but argued that it must have come from another man, an unknown rapist with the exact same genetic code. Milwaukee authorities just laughed. They knew that unless Turner had an identical twin -- which he didn't -- the chance of someone sharing his genetic code was about 3 trillion to 1. Turner was convicted in March 1999. A few months later, as Turner sat in jail waiting to be sentenced, something astonishing happened. Police investigating a new rape compared the alleged attacker's DNA with samples from other sex crimes, and found a match. It was Turner, who of course had an ironclad alibi — he was in jail. Was Turner innocent all along? Against astronomical odds, could there really be another rapist with his DNA profile in the Milwaukee area? If so, that would shatter the entire premise of DNA technology. As it turned out, the DNA was indeed Turner's. Milwaukee authorities discovered a clever scam: Turner, determined to cast doubt on the science upon which his conviction was based, had smuggled a sample of his own semen out of jail, concealed in what had been a ketchup packet. Family members then paid a woman $50 to use the sperm to stage a phony rape. Turner wound up being sentenced to 120 years in prison.

This is one of the biggest flaws with DNA profiles. There is no problem in its use to identify a dead body, say, as it is known for certain that the sample came from the body in question. Likewise, no problem in its use as evidence of exclusion from a crime. But and a its a very big BUT unless there is strong independent conventional evidence, as well, how can anyone say where a few cells containing DNA came from.

In the same vein (nudge,nudge) when I first saw this story I did not believe a word of it. But it is all officially documented and even video tape of one of the blood samplings.
http://canada.com/national/story.asp?id=0C850589-3255-4AEE-8FA1-1857F3A29D00
or story on Google Cache version of http://www.mdcanada.ca/issues/PrinterFriendly.asp?story_id=6284114941&id=148330&RType=&PC=&issue=03012004
Quote
... The case unfolded in 1992 when an unwed mother told police she'd been drugged and raped in hospital by her family doctor. The scene was Kipling, Sask., a small farm town where the doctor was not only wealthy, but popular. Few believed his accuser and instead bought into his claim she was bent on extortion. Three voluntary blood tests and seven years later, the semen found on the woman's underwear still didn't match the doctor's DNA, baffling his victim. John Schneeberger was only charged after she hired a private investigator to steal lip balm from his truck to perform an independent DNA test. Weeks later, RCMP plucked 25 hairs from Schneeberger's head and finally matched his DNA to the semen. In 1999, the doctor told a packed courtroom the woman broke into his home, stole a used condom and wiped its contents on her underwear to frame him. Because he needed to protect his family and wealth from this woman, he devised a plan. With a surgeon's scalpel, he sliced deep into his lower bicep and implanted a plastic vein under the skin. In a Penrose drain, he stored another man's blood so that when police came to collect a sample to match DNA, he was prepared. Instead of removing blood from Schneeberger's vein it was drawn from the plastic tube.

Vulnerability of the UK NDNAD

Just for the record the address of where the UK NDNAD store of DNA samples is printed on page 229 of the HMSO "National Asset Register, 2001" in any major UK library
The information in this section is now more accurate courtesy of the actions of Special Branch indicating what exactly was significant.
Frontispiece states "Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister, by command of Her Majesty ,July 2001"
Also on the internet at
www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/5/4/214.pdf HM Treasury site was http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/0B5/E0/214.pdf was http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/mediastore/otherfiles/214.pdf
and from http://www.forensic.gov.uk/forensic_t/scenesafe/miscellaneous/Forensic_bulletins/pdfs/Forensic_Bulletin_9.pdf "DNA2 casework samples for conversion to intelligence samples should be submitted to FSS sample reception at Oldbury with a covering letter clearly stating they are for conversion to intelligence samples."
Named with inspired lunacy after Professor Sir Alec Jeffreys the inventor of DNA profiling note not Jeffrey's in the address.
Oldbury Facility, Jeffreys House, 1 Wharfside, Rounds Green Road, Oldbury, West Midlands, B69 2BU: a purpose built industrial building used partly as a store and partly fitted as office and laboratory space. Occupied from 1997 on a 20-year lease until 2017; 1012 square metres.
And further background again in the public domain from 5 May 2001 New Scientist Pages 10-12. http://www.newscientist.com (archive free but registration required)
Quote
The DNA Police
By David Concar
IN THE US, it would be protected by steel doors and armed guards. In Britain, anonymity does the job. Tucked away on an industrial estate near Birmingham, you'd scarcely know the brick-and-glass building was there-let alone that it houses the biggest collection of human DNA in the world. A collection that's getting bigger and more contentious-by the day. For years, police in Britain have been quietly exercising their right to collect saliva swabs from almost anyone they take into custody. Those swabs now fill scores of industrial freezers in the basement of the anonymous looking building. Upstairs, a database holds over a million DNA profiles based on these samples. And because crime never stops, up to 3000 new samples arrive every day.
End Quote
Vulnerable to flooding either deliberate or by cloud-burst / flash flooding. They have to have this backstop, of stored DNA samples, for everyone profiled because the science is flaky. No one can be sure a particular DNA profile truly represents a DNA sample, until it is multiple-tested. They also need it for cross-comparison on international database trawls, to test with loci not used in the UK.


Technical Problems with DNA Profiles

Lack of Validation

Conventional fingerprint forensic evidence has been around for over 100 years and you would think it was tried and tested technology but not the case. See the cases of police detective Shirley McKie and David Asbury in Scotland Shirley Mckie the forensic fingerprint details are worth downloading to look at.
and another cock-up concerning friction ridge, dermal fingerprints Rick Jackson ,Upper Darby, Pa,USA

I still have not found a proper validation study where someone has taken DNA material ,divided it and sent it to different forensic labs for analysis. The series in Analytical Chemistry "Inter-laboratory Comparison of Autoradigraphic DNA Profiling measurements" part 1 ,Oct 16 1994; part 2 April 1 1995; part 3 June 1 ,1996 and part 4 May 15 1997 relate to RFLP rather than PCR processing.
If tested by different labs, on different machines, but looking at the same loci and the results came back as differing alleles where would all this DNA profiling be then ?
Take some blood samples, divide up and send to different labs to process under normal batch processing ,do 10 loci profiles and collate the results. Not surprising, no-one has done so because I recently found this report in Forensic Science International Vol 86 (1997) p25-33

This experiment limited itself to just 2 of the loci used in the 10 loci UK Forensic Science Service DNA database. 7 blood samples were taken and divided and sent to 16 different laboratories around the world. These were tested knowing the significance and not part of routine (possibly less rigorous ) batch processing .
The multinationals, surprise surprise, do not release this information and no-one outside the industry, unbelievably, would seem to have done such validation. For all I know this industry could be a house of cards build on sand. The nearest I have is from FSI Vol 86,1997,p25-33
Source reference: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6T6W-3W0G0CK-3&_user=10&_handle=W-WA-A-A-AY-MsSAYVW-UUW-AUDDEAAUEW-WZZZEWCAW-AY-U&_fmt=summary&_coverDate=04%2F18%2F1997&_rdoc=3&_orig=browse&_srch=%23toc%235041%231997%23999139998%2375689!&_cdi=5041&view=c&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=4d7a6643c27f043e66bfe63e3729a47c
Abstract of the FSI article
7 samples divided ,sent to 16 labs and checked blind on the 2 loci D21 and FGA then as 2 alleles per locus 448 data-points in total. Bear in mind all the labs knew these were validation samples so could easily have been on their "best behaviour". E.g. not (say) using an unbalanced centrifuge in the lab at the same time, that could mechanically vibrate the DNA processor, or (say) not using a known electrically noisy motorised bit of kit that pumps noise spikes down the mains etc etc.
There were 18 errors in that returned data the worst being (23,23) returned as (21,21) i.e. 2 bins away from the "correct".
'Invalidation ' of DNA profiling - FGA
 'Invalidation' of DNA profiles - FGA
'Correct' results (majority in agreement) are in the first two columns. Erroneous results highlighted next to red blobs. Lab '13' would not have been aware of any problems as for all they knew some false de-natured samples could have been included. HUMFIBRA is also known as FGA. Note [8] is Urquart to Moeller conversion formula.

'Invalidation ' of DNA profiling - D21
 'Invalidation' of DNA profiles - D21
So with an error rate of 18 in 448 or 1 in 25, one of the figures in my (un-fudged) profile could easily be incorrect - who would know ? Until it is repeated on different machines, with different personel, at different times, at different labs, with different reagent batches, and a concencus "correct" result emerges, then no-one knows. Again there is the same uncertainty to any SoCo sample, one figure in 20 can easily be wrong by one or more.
The "correct result" [i.e. most labs in agreement (there is a whole treatise just on this aside, as everything in DNA "science" is inferred ) ] from 13 of the labs was for locus HUMFIBRA ( FGA ) 2 alleles per sample and 7 samples
21,25 ; 23,24 ; 22,22.2 ; 23,23 ; 18,23 ; 18,22 ; 23.2,24
but for lab "1" ; 23,24 returned as 22,26
for lab "11" ; 22,22.2 returned as 22,22
and for lab " 13" ; 23,23 returned 21,21 ; 18,22 returned 17,19.2 and 23,24 returned as no result obtained and 23.2,24 returned as no result obtained i.e. just 3 of the 7 samples matched.
Well at least they were honourable enough to report it all.
On the second locus D21S11 better agreement
7 consensus 'correct' results 59,63;63,67;63,65;61,65;61,70;61,63;59,65
- only one lab at variance the 61,65 pair returned as 61,63 ; 59,65 returned as 61,63 and no result found for the 63,67 pair.

DNA profile error rate now down to 4 per cent - official

That is 4 in 100 forensic DNA profiles as used in the UK consisting of 10 markers and 20 datapoints. Most recent data from journal article
International Journal of Legal Medicine (2004 ) 118: p83-89
http://www.springerlink.com/app/home/contribution.asp?wasp=847987d4f86447faa3e8be5a4106a539&referrer=parent&backto=issue,4,13;journal,10,54;linkingpublicationresults,1:101167,1
or http://tinyurl.com/82rk9
July 2005 I find it is now available on the web as
http://medweb.unimuenster.de/institute/remed/spurenkommission/Information/IJLM_GEDNAP_II.pdf
http://medweb.uni-muenster.de/institute/remed/spurenkommission/Information/IJLM_Rand_etal.pdf
http://medweb.uni-muenster.de/institute/remed/gednap/Information/IJLM_GEDNAP_II.pdf
The GEDNAP blind trial concept part 2. Data for year 2002 which is an improvement
2001, 5 per cent erroneous profiles.
2000 , 7 per cent erroneous profiles.
This data is anonymised so the good and bad are lumped together - considering the bad do not know they are bad (or at best, in disagreement with the consensus).
These are the results of GEDNAP ( German DNA Profiling Group ) blind trials of testing samples at 136 labs in 30 European countries.

 GEDNAP IJLM
First thing to note this was blind trial ( not double blind ) so all participants knew in advance and could process immediately after calibration, not post-pub Friday afternoon processing / interpretation/ transciption etc.
Much of the 'improvement' is because:
Many incorrect results in previous GEDNAP trials had been due to specific types of body-fluid stains so those "have since been discontinued because of the inconsistency of the amount of DNA present " from the more recent trials, despite those sorts of stains being commonly found forensically. Then the intractable human error:-
"most of the errors were made each time by a very few number of laboratories and of course compound errors such as interchange of two samples caused a disproportionate number of errors relative to the one mistake made when sampling the wrong test stain. However, this is not taken into consideration when calculating the error rate." ( these specific errors included or excluded in the calculated error rate? )
"the most common type of error has always been transcriptional errors followed by incorrect interpretation due to failing to recognise an error, these types of human error are to some extent unavoidable under any prevailing circumstances."
I repeat this is results from labs knowing they were being tested and presumably on their best behaviour.
Then the more technical/ systemic problems producing mistyping because of stutter, 'long alleles', unrecognised rare alleles etc. Interesting examples where the automated processing has failed to differentiate and requiring human 'correction' - their term. The accompanying printoff examples show just how subjective these can be. This is all from ideal provided test-sample stains.
Table 1
Results expressed as single loci because there is no standard set used in all Europe. Results for Gednap 20 & 21 which show 0.7 per cent on 13,868 single loci tests gives an error rate of 1 in 11 expressed for CODIS profiles, 1 in 14 for UK FSS 10 loci profiles. After that result they moved the goal posts. They dropped the stains such as "cigarette butts and mixtures of body fluids as well as hairs". Because these samples were producing disproportionately more errors. Beggars belief doesn't it - just how often, forensically, do they find 50/50 blood/blood traces, victim and offender bleeding the same amount ?. Taking the most recent, moved goal post, GEDNAP results and expressing in terms of 13 loci CODIS profiles then 1 in 19 is erroneous by 1 locus which is all that is needed to produce an erroneous profile
19 correct out of 20 datapoints is fine in 4 out of 100 DNA profiles if you are identifying body parts, say, from a small pool of possibles but not for the usual forensic purposes of implied uniqueness.

Also, from FSI 143 (2004) 47-52
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6T6W-4C2R3WD-1&_user=10&_handle=V-WA-A-W-AW-MsSAYWA-UUA-U-AAWCUVYYCW-AAWWZWEZCW-WCUAABZEE-AW-U&_fmt=summary&_coverDate=06%2F30%2F2004&_rdoc=4&_orig=browse&_srch=%23toc%235041%232004%23998569998%23503752!&_cdi=5041&view=c&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=9c0b7e5969279f0689686c46d6198bd1
or http://tinyurl.com/75dbu
False Homozygosities comparing 2 DNA profiling kits with divided samples taken from 2055 individuals showing 15 errors comparing SGM plus results to Powerplex 16 results on 5 loci , so error rate of 0.7 per cent or 1 in 140.
Person	SGM	Powerplex
vWA
1	15,15	15,17
2	17,17	17,18
3	15,15	15,18
4	16,16	16,18
5	18,18	18,21
D8S1179
6	12,12	12,16
7	14,14	10,14
8	13,13	13,18
FGA
9	22,25	25,25
10	23,23	21,23
D18S51
11	14,16	14,14
12	10,10	10,18
13	15,16	15,15
So false homozygosity slippage by as much as 8 alleles.

And one error on D5S818 comparing Profiler and Powerplex
10,11	11,11
10,12	12,12

The tally for errors on the cross comparison
of Powerflex and SGM+ on (2055 minus 254 )
samples for the 8 common to both were
VWA ; 5
D8 ; 3
FGA ; 2
D18 ; 3
D21 ; 0
D16 ; 0
D3 ; 0
THO1 ; 0

Until further evidence emerges for FH errors
concerning D19, D2 used in the UK and
D5,D13,D7,TPOX,CSF1PO for CODIS (for more than
254 samples) then
these are the revised figures using the average
for those 8 to represent the others
SGM+ ; 10/8 * 13/(2055-254) = 0.009
CODIS ; 13/8 * 13/(2055-254) = 0.012

Reference sample DNA Profile error rates
SGM+ fundamental single kit error rate = 0.9 percent
CODIS fundamental single kit error rate = 1.2 prcent


This is a systemic failing and for normal single kit only processing, sets the other bound for error rates. So error rates from such studies are
In FSS 10 loci terms between 1 in 14 to 1 in 140 wrong
Confirmed , near enough, by FSS study published in
FSI 112 (2000) 151-161
Comparing just SGM and SGM plus and they have the arrogance or niaivety to state "This is a rare event" The false result turns up in the SGM flavour that is currently used, not the older version. Concerning one HUMFIBRA result " The crime scene stain and reference samples were designated as 19,26 with SGM wheras the SGM Plus results showed only a 19 allele". Consistent error as it was repeated, 167 samples, so 1 in 167 is the corresponding figure so in no way can be considered rare when they also have the arrogance to quote 1 in billions for false match figures.
In USA, CODIS 13 loci terms, 1 in 11 to 1 in 140 wrong. My profile apparently has 3 homozygous pairs - is that true or an artifice ?. If I could afford it I would go to an independent lab and have it tested with something other than SGM kit. It is my conjecture that my profile may falsely match with other people in the UK with even more likelihood because they also have apparent homozygosities at D8(13,13),D21(29,29),D16(12,12) when in fact we are all different on 10 loci but SGM falsely registers these false homozygosities.
As far as I know no-one has analysed and published the results of checking for co-ancestry and independence i.e. say inheriting a 17 on D2 does not predispose to inheriting a 15 on D18 say , by checking hundreds of thousands of such profiles. Similar to people of one background ,having blue eyes are likely to have blonde hair and someone from another backgrond with black hair are more likely to have dark eyes.


A good review of DNA profile technical problems with lab printout examples
In depth grounds for questioning reliability of DNA evidence
Some further exploration of DNA profile problems
DNA Evidence: is it safe to convict?
DNA Evidence: science or smoke and mirrors?

I can be pretty certain my following critique of DNA profiling will not be published in the likes of Forensic Science International.
Proponents of mass DNA profiling like to trot out large googol type numbers giving the probability of 2 people having the same DNA profile, seemingly derived from little more than, some sort of product rule of number of markers and the number of possible sites on these markers. They use some pretty impenetrable statistics to show there is no aliassing between these DNA markers. That is, they are of the opinion that the inheritance of these marker sites is independent. Saying, if you inherit one set of "numbers" on one marker then you are NOT predisposed to inherit a given set of "numbers" on another site. I would rather rely on figures derived from real life.
I tried getting full details from Professor Chaseling but she did not reply to my email enquiries of 20 Jan, 2002 and 14 April ,2002. In Australia a Prof Janet Chaseling of Griffith University did an experiment taking DNA samples from the likes of politicians and blood donors; reported in the Sydney Morning Herald 22/04/2000.
The Sydney article no longer available from the original site
or